the evolving coin consensus on afghanistan

Some good advice from a guest blog feature titled "How not to Lose Afghanistan" at the New York Times:

John Nagl:

“However, insurgencies are not defeated by foreign forces. They are defeated by the security services of the afflicted nation. Thus the long-term answer to the Taliban’s insurgency has to be a much expanded Afghan National Army. Currently 70,000 and projected to grow to 135,000, the Afghan army is the most respected institution in that troubled country. It may need to reach 250,000, and be supported by a similarly sized police force, to provide the security that will cause the Taliban to wither. Building such an Afghan Army will be a long-term effort that will require American equipment and advisers for many years, but since the Afghans can field about 70 troops for the cost of one deployed American soldier, there is no faster, cheaper or better way to win.”

Parag Khanna:

“Even if an additional 30,000 American and NATO troops were deployed in southern and eastern Afghanistan, the Taliban problem would not be reduced. It would merely be pushed back over the Pakistan border, destabilizing Pakistan’s already volatile North-West Frontier Province, which itself is more populous than Iraq. This amounts to squeezing a balloon on one end to inflate it on the other.”

Also, the following from Norman Seip, via SWJ:

“In the future, Soft Power will be applied across the spectrum of military operations, combining kinetic effects (Hard Power) with economic, political, cultural and military Soft Power campaigns — a concept termed “Smart Power” by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during her confirmation hearings. For military members, Soft Power employment must become part of the services’ core competencies, second nature to the warfighter and planner.

In doing so, militaries will have to involve other vital contributors — an evolution as dramatic for the services as the “joint” movement of the 1980s — such as Department of State, government agencies, law enforcement, non-governmental organizations and private enterprise.”

Finally, "Aligning a Counterinsurgency Strategy for Afghanistan," from Lt. Col. Raymond Millen at SWJ, deserves a full reading:

As this article reveals, the principle of Subsidiarity forms the underlying approach to a counterinsurgency strategy for Afghanistan. In essence, Subsidiarity embraces decentralization of governance to the lowest level. Because this form of federalism has a long-standing tradition in Afghanistan (as well as the West), the populace readily accepts the concept. This concept permits the central government to focus on national issues. However, it does not signify neglect. Rather, it permits federal, international, and coalition agencies to empower local communities in a decentralized manner without deleterious intrusion from above. In short, it shifts the counterinsurgency effort to the local communities.